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Introduction
From the beginnings of time, the human heart has continually occupied a central position within the world's
varied cultures. This centrality is illustrated by the numerous ways in which references to the heart pervade
contemporary language and discourse. A resilient soul who refuses to cower in the face of adversity is said
to have the \heart of a lion." Persons characterized by extreme generosity are deemed to have \hearts of
gold." Those who fail at romance suer from \broken" hearts. Viewed as a symbol of love, compassion,
courage, and countless other higher order human aspirations, the sacred heart will forever serve an unsur-
passed metaphoric role within our lives.
While the cultural and social signicance of the heart is almost immeasurable, its scientic traits are no less
staggering. Weighing a mere pound, and occupying as much space as a clenched st, the heart shoulders the
responsibility for pumping blood throughout the entire human circulatory system.1 The circulatory system
1See Heart, How it Works, at http://www.americanheart.org/Heart and Stroke A Z GuId.e/hworks.html (April 6, 2001)
1delivers much needed oxygen and nutrients to the organs and tissues of the body, and then returns depleted
blood to the heart and the lungs for regeneration.2 This perpetual cycle represents the scientic essence of
human life. On an average day, the heart will \beat", i.e. expand and contract, nearly 100,000 times, while
pumping about 2000 gallons of blood.3 In a 70-year lifetime, a normal heart will beat more than 2.5 billion
times.4
Given the arduous physical demands placed on the human heart, it should come as no surprise that heart
disease represents one of society's gravest health risks. Essentially, heart disease is present when the pumping
and circulatory functions described above encounter interference. Although heart disease comes in myriad
forms, its variations can be grouped into two basic categories. \Congenital" heart disease involves organ
defects that are inborn, or existent at birth.5 These defects may impede the ow of blood in the heart or
in the vessels near it.6 Furthermore, the defects may cause blood to ow through the heart in abnormal
patterns.7 \Congestive" heart failure, on the other hand, doesn't necessarily involve inborn organ defects.
Rather, this condition is present when the heart's pumping function is restricted by an underlying medical
condition that has developed over time, such as clogged arteries or high blood pressure.8
Congenital and congestive forms of heart disease take an enormous toll on society. As noted previously,
the heart's pumping action supplies the body with the oxygen and nutrient-rich blood it needs in order to
function properly.9 Persons plagued by early and middle stage heart disease suer from a shortage of these
life-sustaining elements. Thus, such persons often tend to feel weak, fatigued, and short of breath.10 As
2Id.
3Id.
4Id.
5See Congenital Cardiovascular Disease, at http://www.americanheart.org/Heart and Stroke A Z GuId.e/conghd.html
(April 6, 2001)
6Id.
7Id.
8See Congestive Heart Failure, at http://www.americanheart.org/Heart and Stroke A Z GuId.e/congest.html (April 6,
2001)
9See Understanding Heart Failure, at http://www.americanheart.org/chf/understanding/index.htm (April 6, 2001)
10Id.
2the American Heart Association notes, basic daily activities such as walking, climbing stairs, and carrying
groceries can begin to feel like insurmountable tasks for patients suering within this category.11
While the productivity and lifestyle-related losses that stem from early and middle stage heart disease are
quite substantial, the terrifying impact of this health condition is most clearly illustrated by the experiences
of those suering at the end-stage of the disease. Each year, nearly 1,000,000 people die from complications
of cardiovascular disease.12 Indeed, according to some experts, heart disease kills as many persons as nearly
all other causes of death combined.13 Because of the substantial strain that heart disease places on society,
physicians, scientists and policy makers have, for decades, devoted signicant amounts of time and resources
to combating its eects. Furthermore, numerous health organizations have undertaken eorts to better ed-
ucate the public about demonstrable linkages between heart disease and personal choices regarding diet and
lifestyle.14 Despite these eorts, however, a large segment of the population lives with hearts that have been
severely damaged by heart disease, and thus face imminent death. For such patients, the traditional course
of action has been allotransplantation, namely, a transplant process involving a human donor heart.15 This
technique has undergone myriad improvements over the past several decades, and the health outcomes now
associated with it are remarkably positive, at least in the near term. Indeed, \the 85% immediate survivors,
65% ve-year survivors and the 40% ten-year survivors generally have good functional capacity."16 The
virtues of allotransplantation, however, are necessarily limited by the inherent scarcity of donor hearts. The
market for donor hearts is one area in which demand has always outpaced supply. Each year, about 30,000
11Id.
12Robert J. Lefkowitz and James T. Willerson, \Prospects for Cardiovascular Research", Journal of the American Medical
Association, Vol. 285 No. 5, (February 7, 2001), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v285n5/ull/jsc00362.html
(March 3, 2001)
13See O.H. Frazier, MD, John M. Fuqua, Jr., and David N. Helman, MD, Clinical Left Heart Assist Devices: A Historical
Perspective, in Daniel J. Goldstein, MD and Mehmet C. Oz, MD, Cardiac Assist Devices, Futura Publishing Company, Inc.,
Armonk,NY (2000), p.3
14See Understanding Heart Failure, supra note 9, at 2
15See Expert Panel Review of the NHLBI Total Articial Heart Program, June 1998-November 1999, Vallee Willman (chair),
available at http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/resources/docs/tah-rpt.htm (April 6, 2001), p. 14
16Id.
3patients are deemed eligible candidates for heart transplantation.17 However, only a small fraction of this
group, numbering about 2000, actually winds up receiving donor hearts.18 Given the current gures, it is
unlikely that the supply of donor hearts will increase enough to render allotransplantation a viable means of
combating end-stage heart disease on a macro level.
Articial heart technology represents society's most promising attempt at lling the above void. This tech-
nology has two main branches. Partial devices supplement patients' natural heart function, assisting those
patients whose organs, while somewhat viable, are incapable of functioning adequately on their own. Total
articial hearts (TAH), on the other hand, are devices that actually replace patients' natural hearts. Such
devices are designed for situations in which natural organs are so damaged that even supplementation via a
partial device isn't enough to produce sucient circulatory function. Collectively, partial and total articial
heart devices are classied as mechanical circulatory support systems (MCSS). Surgeons employing these
devices face the unenviable challenge of outwitting the human body. Although it is relatively easy to slip
pumps inside the body, it is dicult to do so in a manner that prevents the body from discovering this
intrusion and ultimately rejecting the devices.19
MCSS technology has the capacity to benet patients in three primary ways. First, devices can serve as
\bridges" to transplant, allowing patients' conditions to stabilize while they await the delivery of donor
hearts. Second, partial devices can be used, either temporarily or permanently, to allow a patient's natural
heart to rest and recover following periods of distress. Finally, TAH devices can potentially serve as per-
manent replacements for those patients whose natural hearts are too damaged to permit recovery through
alternative means. Replacement TAH devices represent the cutting edge of technology in this eld. While
their composition must accommodate a seemingly innite number of scientic constraints, researchers are
17See Zina Moukheiber, Lonely Heart, Forbes Magazine (April 17, 2000), available at
www.forbes.com/forbes/2000/0417/6509430a.html (April 6, 2001)
18Id.
19See Transcript of NOVA #2617: \Electric Heart" (PBS Air date December 21, 1999), available at wysi-
wyg://17/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2617eheart.html (March 7, 2001)
4optimistic about their potential benets. According to some observers, as these devices begin to improve
in terms of their longevity and reliability, their success rates will begin to approximate those of the current
\gold standard," namely allotransplantation, and may ultimately even exceed them.20 Advances in the area
of articial heart technology are particularly important at a time when non-surgical treatment methods for
heart disease are deemed palliative at best, and are characterized by high mortality rates and uncertainty.21
Indeed, some experts estimate that nearly half of the yearly deaths attributable to heart disease might be
postponed through the use of MCSS.22
Articial heart technology is subject to FDA regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 (\Act"). The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (\Amendments") to the Act establish three regula-
tory classes for medical devices, \based on the degree of control necessary to assure that the various types of
devices are safe and eective."23 Articial heart devices are considered part of Class III, and are thus subject
to the heaviest possible regulation. A Class III device is dened in the Amendments as \one that supports
or sustains human life or is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health or presents
a potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury."24 Class III medical devices may not be marketed by rms
until the FDA has approved a pre-market approval (PMA) application under Section 515 of the Act.25 This
statute, along with relevant FDA regulations, permits investigational uses of unapproved medical devices
in certain situations. Such uses are allowed for the purpose of garnering the safety and eectiveness data
necessary to support a rm's PMA application. However, investigational uses, in the form of clinical trials,
are only permissible once FDA has approved a rm's application for an Investigational Device Exemption
20See The Articial Heart: Prototypes, Policies, and Patients, Committee to Evaluate the Articial Heart Program of the
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, Division of Health Care Services, Institute of Medicine, John R. Hogness and Malin
VanAntwerp (Eds.), National Academy Press (Washington D.C 1991), p.4
21Id., at 35
22Id., at 16
23See Information on Premarket Approval Applications, at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/pmapage.html (April 18, 2001)
24Id.
25Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law, 2d ed, The Foundation Press, Inc. (Westbury, NY 1991),
p. 756
5(IDE). IDE's are authorized under Section 520(g) of the Act. The function of an IDE application is two-fold.
First, the application species the nature, purpose, and justication of the human clinical study proposed
by a rm.26 Second, the application presents substantial data that describes the device's mechanical design
and its functioning during proper operation, while indicating a likelihood of successful clinical trials through
reference to test-results from the pre-clinical stages of development.27
When the regulatory system is functioning properly, the IDE and PMA approval processes arguably protect
the market by weeding out devices deemed unsafe for society. However, \while the IDE system appears to
have worked well for routine long term investigations of new devices...it seems less well-suited to studies of
devices that are deployed infrequently but usually in an emergency setting."28 Recognizing that emergency
scenarios may arise in which uses of unapproved medical devices represent the best hopes for patients, the
IDE regulation, 21 C.F.R. 812.35(a), \permits deviations from the investigational plan when necessary to
protect the life or physical well-being of a subject in an emergency."29 Further advice regarding emergency
use is supplied in a related FDA guidance document.30 The document suggests that a physician's use of an
unapproved medical device, namely one that has received neither PMA nor IDE approval, will not spawn
a negative response from FDA if such use is justied on the basis of an \emergency". An \emergency", as
dened in the document, requires satisfaction of the following three pronged test:
1.
The patient is in a life-threatening condition that needs immediate treatment;
26\Abiomed Requests FDA Approval to Begin Human Trials of AbioCor Replacement Heart", December 22, 2000, at
http://www.abiomed.com/about/press/122200.html (February 23, 2001)
27Id.
28see Food and Drug Law, supra note 25, at 757
29\Guidance on IDE Policies and Procedures", at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/Idepolcy.html (April 18, 2001)
30\Guidance for the Emergency Use of Unapproved Medical Devices; Availability", 50 Federal Register 42866 (October 25,
1985), in Food and Drug Law, supra note 25, p. 759
62.
No generally acceptable alternative for treating the patient is available; and
3.
Because of the immediate need to use the device, there is no time to use existing procedures to get FDA approval for the use.31
Although the emergency use exception provides only a limited window in which to test articial heart
technology, it has nonetheless equipped some physicians with the ammunition necessary to deal with patients
in particularly dire situations. Furthermore, clinical experiences with such patients have provided important
lessons for surgeons and scientists hoping to one day gain approval for their projects through the formal
regulatory process.
This paper tracks the historical evolution of articial heart technology, from its humble beginnings, to its
relatively staggering current potential. While examining various milestones along this fascinating timeline,
the paper attempts to shed light on some of the ethical, economic, and social dilemmas that have infused
this history. In doing so, it strives to provide the reader with a sense of the various factors, some technical
in nature and others purely societal, that have wielded inuence on this evolutionary process.
In conclusion, the paper proposes lessons for the future that can be gleaned from the experiences of heart re-
searchers over the past several decades, and briey assesses the impact that the development and proliferation
of articial heart technology will ultimately have on our nation's health care system.
Early History of TAH Devices
7The development of total articial heart technology can be traced to the early 1960's. At that time, most
physicians in the eld of heart surgery \had only begun to learn how to stop the heart, repair and start it
again."32 However, Dr. Michael E. DeBakey had grander ambitions. DeBakey, a prominent surgeon at the
Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, was a colorful and volatile gure known in medical circles as the
\Texas Tornado" because of the admiration and fear he inspired in his colleagues.33 His research interests
led him to form a team whose purpose was to explore the feasibility of building an articial device that could
replace the natural human heart. DeBakey and his team were initially optimistic about the prospects for
producing a well functioning device due to the relatively crude science that underlies the heart's pumping
action. In his words, \We were thinking of the heart as just a pump, and it seemed logical that if that's the
main function, you ought to be able to duplicate that mechanically."34
DeBakey displayed this unfailing optimism while proposing a federal program to aid in the development of
articial heart technology during a 1963 congressional hearing. At this hearing, DeBakey asserted,
Experimentally, it is possible to completely replace the heart with an articial heart, and animals
have been known to survive as long as 36 hours. This idea, I am sure, could be reached to full
fruition if we had more funds to support work, particularly in the bioengineering area.35
The optimism of DeBakey and others in the eld of heart surgery wielded considerable inuence on lawmakers
charged with the task of allocating funds to related research. This inuence was augmented by the fact that
the general population was beginning to experience \sky-high levels of heart disease."36 Indeed, by 1965,
a federal articial heart program had been created, and its enabling legislation asserted that the program's
32Controversies from the Heart: Quest for Articial Device Has Been Full of Con-
tention, Drama, Ruth SoRelle, Houston Chronicle, (October 11, 1997), available at
http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/metropolitan/heart/heart-history.3-0.html (March 3, 2001)
33see Transcript, supra note 19
34Id.
36\PBS- Scientic American Frontiers: Aairs of the Heart: Searching for a Substitute," at
http://www.pbs.org/saf/1104/features/substitute2.htm (February 21, 2001)
8formation had been undertaken \with a sense of urgency."37 Under this program, 40 million dollars of
funding was allocated towards heart research over four years, with human implantation tentatively slated to
begin in 1970.38
However, not all the principal players in this area shared the same values and priorities. Indeed, Dr. James
Shannon, then head of the National Institutes of Health, believed that the excitement over articial hearts
was premature given the state of existing technology. Thus, he directed half of the funding received under
the federal program to alternative forms of heart research, eectively stunting the pace and progress of eorts
geared towards the development of articial hearts.39
Despite these constraining factors, some members of Dr. DeBakey's research team in Houston were intent
on pushing forward with the development of a total articial heart. In the late 1960's Dr. Domingo Liotta,
one of the team's principal researchers, approached DeBakey about the possibility of utilizing an articial
pump within human clinical trials. DeBakey was categorically opposed to the suggestion due to the limited
level of success achieved during experiments conducted on animals. Today, DeBakey notes, \I explained to
[Liotta] that we couldn't do that because [the pump] had been used in seven calves, four of which had died
on the operating table. We couldn't go and get approval from our committee."40
Undaunted by DeBakey's unwillingness to proceed, Liotta approached Dr. Denton Cooley, a prot eg e and
colleague of DeBakey, and a surgeon at the nearby Texas Heart Institute.41 After meeting with Liotta,
Cooley became convinced that a human trial of an articial heart device was in fact an appropriate course
of action. He felt that DeBakey's refusal to take the next big step in articial heart research indicated an
overall lack of interest in the project. Liotta, on the other hand, feared that the countless hours he had
37see Controversies, supra note 32
38Id.
39Id.
40see Transcript, supra note 19
41Id.
9spent toiling away in research labs and experimenting on animals would ultimately go to waste if the pump
did not undergo the litmus test of a human trial. In the words of Cooley, \I thought, and agreed with Dr.
Liotta, the time had come to really give [the pump] a test, and the only real test would be to apply it to a
dying patient."42
Cooley and Liotta decided to proceed surreptitiously with their plan to utilize an articial pump in a human
patient. They would seek approval for their slated experiment from neither their internal committees nor
external governing bodies such as the FDA. Today, while acknowledging that such approval probably would
have been withheld, Cooley notes that \in those days, I didn't feel like we needed permission," other than
the patient's consent.43
The visions of Cooley and Liotta came to fruition on April 4, 1969. That day, Cooley implanted an articial
heart into the chest cavity of 47 year old Haskell Karp of Skokie, Illinois, a printing estimator with a long
history of heart related problems.44 The \Liotta" device utilized in the operation had two chambers, and
functioned in much the same fashion as a natural human heart, with one signicant exception: \it was
powered by enormous air pumps outside of the body, using hoses to pass through the patient's body wall
and into the circulatory system."45
Karp relied on the articial device for more than two and a half days as he awaited the delivery of a human
donor organ. However, shortly after receiving a human heart transplant at the Texas Heart Institute, Haskell
Karp died of infection and related complications.
The Karp research episode was lled with controversy from top to bottom. First, the device to which Karp
had been tethered while awaiting transplant had created a truly horrifying visual display. This disturbing
42Id.
43Id.
44\A Who's Who of Heart Recipients", Houston Chronicle, at http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/metropolitan/heart/patients.html
(March 10, 2001)
45see \Aairs of the Heart", supra note 36
10spectacle was described by the widow of Haskell Karp during an interview she gave to the BBC:
I saw an apparatus going into the arms, the hands, the feet. He could not say anything. I don't
think that he was really conscious. I see him lying there breathing, and knowing that within his
chest is a man-made implement where there should be a God-given heart.46
This description embodies several of the principal criticisms that were levied against the Karp experiment
shortly after it was commenced. Clearly, the device utilized was bulky and unwieldy, and given the fact that
the patient was incapable of communicating with the outside world while attached to the articial heart,
many began to question the merits of research in this area.
Further controversy arose when Dr. DeBakey publicly acknowledged that the heart utilized by Dr. Cooley
in his treatment of Karp was identical to a device that was under development in DeBakey's labs at Baylor.
DeBakey further asserted that Cooley had used the device without his permission. Cooley then countered
with the assertion that he and Dr. Liotta had actually developed the heart privately.47 This controversy
ultimately served to destroy the relationship between DeBakey and his prot eg e Cooley. Thus, Cooley and
Liotta left Baylor to undertake the quest for the \holy grail"48 of the successfully functioning articial heart
on their own. For her part, Karp's widow led suit against Dr. Cooley, \alleging that she and her husband
had been inadequately informed about the experimental nature of the articial heart."49 The suit, however,
was ultimately dismissed by a federal court judge.50
In essence, the Karp episode indicated that the initial optimism regarding the development of a functional
articial heart had been na ve.51 The scientic constraints involved were signicant, and many years of
eort would be required to overcome them, if such a result was even possible at all. Indeed, by 1971, Dr.
DeBakey himself became convinced that existing total articial heart technology could not overcome the
47see Controversies, supra note 32
48see \Aairs of the Heart", supra note 36
49see \Who's Who", supra note 44
50Id.
51see Controversies, supra note 32
11hurdles intrinsic within the human body. DeBakey was primarily concerned with two major problems.52
First, scientists had to develop a power source that could be totally implantable, in order to reduce the
risk of infection that was created by tethering articial devices to external sources through skin penetrating
pumps. Second, researchers had to discover and rene a non-clotting surface for the parts of the pump that
actually came into contact with blood. Otherwise, the associated risk of stroke in patients would remain
too high to warrant use of the technology. DeBakey ultimately determined that his time was better spent
pursuing alternative avenues of heart research, asserting \I decided to stop putting my energies and eorts
into a total articial heart."53
Cooley, on the other hand, was disappointed in a dierent vein. While he acknowledged the scientic
complexity of the initial experiment he had undertaken, he believed that focusing the public's attention on
the technology's future potential would have a positive eect on the eld of research as a whole. Even during
the experiment, Cooley had asserted that \even if Mr. Karp goes nothing- doesn't go any more than another
day, I think that we have demonstrated that there is validity to this concept."54 However, Cooley had grossly
miscalculated in the realm of public opinion. Confronted with the gruesome images of a suering human
patient, society at large began to regard the entire eld of articial heart technology as \more monstrous
than miraculous," and research eorts in this area were quelled to a substantial degree.55 Cooley, now known
aectionately as \The Man with the Golden Hands", recently reected on the outpouring of public sentiment
in response to the Karp episode. He asserted, \I had hoped it (the Karp implant) would stimulate a urry of
interest in implants. People were discouraged because Haskell Karp didn't live. If he had lived six months,
it might have been dierent."56 Despite Cooley's hopes, however, the development of total articial heart
52Id.
53Id.
54see Transcript, supra note 19
55see \Aairs of the Heart", supra note 36
56see Controversies, supra note 32
12technology, in response to the relative failure of the Karp experiment, stunted for more than a decade.
In the early 1980's a new gure named Dr. Robert Jarvik embarked on the quest for a well-functioning
total articial heart.57 Jarvik had originally planned on pursuing a career as an architect or an engineer.
However, his father's premature death as a result of heart disease pointed him in the direction of cardiac
medicine.58 Jarvik's passion for both the constructive and physical sciences made him an ideal candidate in
the race to develop an articial heart. Indeed, by 1982, Dr. Jarvik had begun conducting animal trials at
the University of Utah with a device that he named the \Jarvik-7".59 The Jarvik-7 was a total heart that
completely replaced the natural organ within the body's chest cavity. Designed to function in a manner that
parallels the human heart, the Jarvik-7 has two ventricle-like pumps, each having a disk-shaped mechanism
that pushes blood from the inlet valve to the outlet valve.60 The Jarvik-7's pumping action mirrors that of
the natural heart, with one primary distinction: \the natural heart is living muscle while the articial heart
is plastic, aluminum, and Dacron polyester. As a result, the articial heart needs some external source of
`life'."61 The device's \life", as such, is supplied by an external powering system that energizes and regulates
pumping action through a system of compressed air hoses that enter the heart through the chest.62 Thus,
the Jarvik-7 is inherently cumbersome and prone to the risk of infection.63
In the early 1980's, Jarvik's team was one of ve predominant groups working in the area of articial heart
research, and they had in fact achieved some degree of success during the initial phases of their work.
Nevertheless, given the state of the economy, and the aversion towards this area of research held by many
members of society, the Jarvik team was strapped for much needed funding. As medical historian Thomas
Preston notes, \Here was a whole section of the university that had done a lot of work, good work, to get
57see Transcript, supra note 19
58Id.
59Id.
60The Franklin Institute Online: Building a Better Heart, at http://s1n.fi.edu/biosci/healthy/fake.html (March 10,
2001)
61Id.
62Id.
63Id.
13to this point, and they were in danger of losing their nancing. And they knew that they needed something
big."64
Nothing, of course, was \bigger" than an attempt at rekindling the ames of human implantation. However,
regulatory approval of such implantation would be almost impossible to obtain for obvious reasons. First,
the device being utilized was, on a fundamental level, quite similar to the device that had been employed
during the Haskell Karp episode of 1969. In the words of Dr. Cooley, \it was an almost identical heart
based on the same principle."65 The notoriety of the Karp experiment militated against directly requesting
regulatory permission to experiment with a device having reminiscent qualities.
Nevertheless, Jarvik and his colleagues were left with an end-run around the normal process of regulatory
approval. As noted in the introduction to this paper, if implantation of the Jarvik-7 for particular patients was
characterized as \necessary, life saving therapy", then such uses would be somewhat immune to regulatory
scrutiny. Such a characterization could be achieved if the patients selected were so ill as to be considered
ineligible for human transplantation. This tiny window of opportunity for \borderline" research practices
has always been a source of controversy within the medical and patient communities. As Preston observes
about the Jarvik plan,
It's interesting and important that the team called it `necessary therapy'. If they had said `Well,
we don't know how long he'll live, then it would have been in the realm of experimentation, and it
wouldn't have been approved.66
Interestingly, FDA ultimately approved an IDE for the Jarvik-7 heart; however, the approval contained strin-
gent protocol conditions that embodied the above factors.67 After obtaining approval for the above form
of transplantation, Jarvik approached Dr. DeBakey to request help with the testing of the Jarvik-7.68 He
proposed that ve of the hearts be implanted at the University of Utah, and that another ve transplants be
64see Transcript, supra note 19
65see Controversies, supra note 32
67see Food and Drug Law, supra note 25, at 757
68see Controversies, supra note 32
14undertaken at Methodist Hospital in Houston. DeBakey was steadfastly opposed to the notion. Like many,
he believed that the Jarvik-7 was hardly dierent from the Baylor heart used in the Karp case. Furthermore,
he felt that research data that might support another such transplant attempt was simply unavailing.
Although he was spurned by the \Texas Tornado", Jarvik found a comrade in Dr. William DeVries, a Utah
surgeon who agreed to perform the device implants. The next hurdle, however, was nding patients that
would be willing to subject themselves to the rigorous and frightening endeavor represented by articial
heart transplantation. Indeed, only patients who were truly on their last legs would be willing to undergo
such operations.
DeVries and Jarvik found such a patient in Barney Clark. Clark, a 61-year old Seattle dentist, was quickly
deteriorating from the eects of heart failure, and his physicians believed that his death was imminent.69
Initially, however, even Clark was apprehensive about obtaining a Jarvik-7 transplant. Nevertheless, he
decided to keep an open mind, and actually made a visit to the veterinary laboratory at the University of
Utah in order to observe the calves that had received device transplants. Two days after this visit, Clark
called Dr. Don Olson, a lead physician on the Jarvik research team, and asserted \The articial heart is not
for me."70
However, soon after making this declaration, Clark's condition began to deteriorate further. He could now
only sleep when propped up on pillows. Furthermore, a dying Clark had begun to appreciate the important
role his transplant could play in terms of guiding future research eorts. In November of 1982, Clark notied
Olson that he was now willing to undergo a transplant operation. \It may not work that well for me," he
said. \I'll do it for the next patient."71
On December 2, 1982, Barney Clark received a Jarvik-7 implant in Salt Lake City.72 From its earliest stages,
69see \Who's Who," supra note 44
70see Controversies, supra note 32
71Id.
72see \Who's Who", supra note 44
15the procedure turned out to be fraught with complications. It seemed that Clark was even sicker than his
doctors had initially believed. By the time Dr Devries had opened Clark's chest and connected the patient
to a heart-lung machine, Clark's natural heart was no longer functional, and had completely stopped on the
operating table.73
Clark was ultimately connected to the Jarvik-7, and managed to survive for 112 days while tethered to
the device.74 However, doctors associated with the operation acknowledge that each of these days was a
struggle in some respect. For one, Clark's blood kept clotting as it owed through the device, and these
clots ultimately led to a number of strokes. Furthermore, some of the device's most important components
were experiencing forms of mechanical malfunctioning. It soon became apparent that one of the critical
valves within the device that had broken in Clark had never undergone stringent testing in the context of an
articial heart.75 A series of operations was needed to repair elements characterized by Jarvik as the \weak
links in the system."76
In addition to the mechanical and medical complications involved in his transplant, Clark was forced to
endure the dicult physical and emotional demands placed on him by the apparatus. The Jarvik-7's large
size, approximately that of a washing machine, and the loud wheezing sounds emitted by its pumping of
compressed air, were noticeable to all who witnessed Clark's progress, or lack thereof, rst hand. Further-
more, the pulses of compressed air that powered the machine \jolted Clark with every beat."77 Nevertheless,
Clark's resolve appeared to strengthen over the course of his 112 day saga. During those limited moments
when he had sucient strength to discuss his condition with the media, he unequivocally expressed support
for the procedure. At one point, Clark described his experience as \a pleasure to be able to help peo-
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16ple...maybe you folks'll learn something."78 What made Clark's contribution to the eld so heroic was the
fact that he never harbored any illusions about miracle outcomes. As Dr. Olson notes, \We considered him
a true pioneer. [Clark] looked at it as one in a long series of experiments. He knew that he would die on the
device."79
Clark's courageous adventure with the Jarvik-7 was a hotly pursued story for the national news media,
which tracked the patient's progress on a continuous basis. As Jarvik reects, \There was this human drama
that was almost like, like a serial, almost like a soap opera: what's going to happen tomorrow?"80 This
\human drama" slowly evolved from a prole in courage to a real life horror show. With regard to public
perceptions, the very source of the Clark transplant's notoriety turned out to be its undoing. Jarvik's team
had touted their device as a form of \destination" therapy. Unlike the articial heart utilized by Haskell
Karp as a \bridge" to transplant, Clark's Jarvik-7 was intended to stay inside his body for the rest of his
life. As Jarvik asserts, \That intention, symbolically, is part of the thing that brought so much attention to
the Barney Clark case."81 However, this intention was also what made the Clark case so problematic. To
the lay observer, strapping patients to bulky and noisy contraptions for life was degrading and cruel, despite
Clark's heroic protestations to the contrary. The fact that the device didn't even work well was simply the
nal straw.
After Clark's death, the Jarvik-7 was implanted in a second patient, 53 year-old William Schroeder, at the
Humana Heart Institute in Louisville, Kentucky.82 Schroeder actually survived on the device for 18 months.
Like Clark, however, Schroeder was plagued by multiple strokes, infections, and hemorrhages throughout the
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17course of his treatment.83 Unlike Clark, however, Schroeder was candid about the physical ordeal created
by the device. Schroeder's painful struggle was witnessed rst hand by Boston University ethicist George
Annas, who described the patient as existing in a twilight state \between being alive and dead."84 When
asked directly for his opinion about the Jarvik-7, Schroeder \made a horrible gesture, like he'd like to kill it
or strangle it."85 After Schroeder's death, public sentiment against articial heart research reached alarming
levels. In response, FDA eectively revoked the IDE granted to the Jarvik-7 program. An FDA advisory
committee reviewing the program noted, \FDA should assume a more direct oversight role as the clinical
trial proceeds, and should approve subsequent implants on a case by case basis."86
Despite the courageous sacrices made by Clark and Schroeder, the high prole failures of the Jarvik implants
had stied rather than stimulated research in the area of total articial heart technology. As Preston notes,
\The value that we got out of that experiment, and that's all it was, was that it was not t to be used at
that time."87 Most researchers now became convinced, as DeBakey had a decade earlier, that the quest for
an eective total articial heart was simply a fruitless endeavor. Furthermore, for those who emerged from
the Jarvik implants with a more optimistic outlook, continued eorts in this area would encounter heated
resistance from both regulatory bodies and the public at large. As a result of these forces, researchers and
surgeons now began to bolster their eorts at nding alternative ways to combat heart disease.
Heart Assist Devices
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18Discouraged by the relative failure of TAH implants in patients like Barney Clark, and society's growing
apprehensiveness towards the very idea of such devices, leaders in the eld of heart research began to focus
their energies on the development of technologies that were less daunting. One such technology involved
the use of simpler \partial" pumps that could assist or supplement the heart's function as it recovered from
surgery. However, while the 1980's witnessed a resurgence in this particular area of research, the development
of heart assist devices can actually be traced to the very beginnings of articial heart technology.
The commencement of the modern era of mechanical circulatory support occurred in the early 1950's with
the work of John H. Gibbon Jr.88 In 1953, Gibbon became the rst surgeon to successfully utilize a car-
diopulmonary bypass (CPB) in a clinical setting.89 The virtue of the CPB, or \heart-lung" machine, was
that it provided a quiet and bloodless eld for physicians performing open-heart surgery. Essentially, the
heart would be temporarily stopped while surgeons operated on the organ. During this period of stoppage,
the CPB machine would take over the circulatory functions normally performed by the natural heart and
lungs. After the surgical procedure was completed, the patient would be gradually removed from the CPB
machine, and normal heart function would be restored.
As surgeons became more adept at performing these procedures, they began to realize that certain heart
patients needed one to two hours of additional cardiac support before they could be successfully removed,
or \weaned", from CPB machines.90 Those patients that could not be weaned would die without ever expe-
riencing the benets aorded by the surgical procedures they had undertaken.
Since pulmonary function was usually adequate in patients utilizing CPB devices, surgeons began to believe
that a more prolonged form of cardiac support was needed.91 While the CPB machine was equipped to
88JH Gibbon Jr. \Application of a Mechanical Heart and Lung Apparatus in Cardiac Surgery." Minn Med 1954;37:171-185
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19provide valuable short-term cardiac support, its use was often a source of damage to end organ function
and to other formed blood elements.92 Furthermore, the mechanical constraints inherent within the CPB
machine implied that the device had a built-in time limit of four to six hours. Essentially, heart surgeons
longed for a less physiologically damaging and longer-term device that would allow the heart to rest long
enough for its intrinsic reparative processes to occur.93
Since the lion's share of the work performed by the heart is attributable to the left ventricle, some researchers
began to search for ways to eliminate left ventricular failure in patients recovering from heart surgery. One
such researcher, C.W. Hall, developed a left ventricular bypass pump.94 Constructed from a Dacron re-
inforced silicone rubber material, this implantable left ventricular assist device (LVAD) could theoretically
take over part of the natural organ's functional role, allowing it to heal following the trauma and distress of
a surgical operation. The device achieved successful results during a series of animal trials.95 Then, on July
18, 1963 the LVAD was implanted in a human patient who had developed cardiogenic shock after undergoing
an aortic valve replacement.96 Although the pump appeared to function in a satisfactory way, the patient in
whom the device had been implanted had suered a serious neurologic injury prior to implantation. Despite
the adequate circulatory support provided by the LVAD, this injury failed to improve. Thus, use of the
LVAD was discontinued after just 4 days.97
In 1966, a more rened version of the pump, named after its creator Dr. DeBakey, was implanted in a
patient following double valve replacement surgery.98 This device, which was placed extracorporeally, could
be removed without actually opening the chest. The patient was supported by this LVAD for ten days
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20as his heart recovered from the turmoil of surgery. Ultimately, he survived and was discharged from the
hospital, marking the rst occasion in which an LVAD had been successfully utilized for the treatment of
postcardiotomy heart failure.99
In the years following this episode, researchers became more adept at utilizing LVAD type devices in patients
post-surgery, and rened versions began to proliferate. Furthermore, a growing consensus was emerging as to
the generally positive results associated with LVAD implantation. A Texas Heart Institute study, for exam-
ple, concluded that LVAD use \could reduce all indices of myocardial work yet increase systemic perfusion
and coronary blood ow."100 Optimistic results such as these convinced some researchers that LVAD devices
could be utilized as \bridges" to transplant for patients awaiting donor organs, in the way that researchers
had previously attempted to employ total articial heart devices. The rst such use of the LVAD occurred in
1978, when a 23-year old patient undergoing double-valve replacement fell victim to irreversible stone heart
failure post-operatively.101 The patient was supported by an LVAD device for seven days as he awaited the
receipt of a donor organ. A second patient received an articial heart implant as a \bridge to transplant"
in 1981 at the Texas Heart Institute.102 While the devices utilized as bridges performed relatively well in
both of these patients, each ultimately died of infectious complications after receiving a donor heart. These
complications were rooted in the aggressive use of immunosuppressant drugs by the patients. Such use was
required in order to avoid the body's rejection of the implanted donor organs. The risk of such use, however,
was that it eectively disabled the body's natural immune system. This disablement was coupled with the
fact that the patients taking the drugs were already plagued by an extremely high risk of infection \as a
result of general contamination from the procedures needed to implant the circulatory support devices."103
Thus, despite their successful functioning, the infectious risks that accompanied the implantation and re-
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21moval of LVAD's initially rendered them an untenable means of stabilizing the condition of patients who
were awaiting the receipt of donor hearts.
In the early 1980's, researchers attempting to utilize LVAD technology to bridge patients to transplant re-
ceived a fortuitous jump-start. Scientists at Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corporation in New Jersey discovered
and developed cyclosporine, an immunosuppressant whose results were far superior to those of previously
marketed drugs.104 The amazing results tied to cyclosporine spawned a resurgence in the eld of heart
transplantation, and many clinical centers that had discontinued their transplant programs began to accept
patients once again. However, donor hearts remained quite scarce, and the problem of patients dying while
on the waiting list for organs began to intensify. To combat this problem, several of the left ventricular
assist systems that had been developed to provide long term support to patients were approved as investiga-
tional devices by the FDA to bridge patients to transplant.105 The results of these trials proved remarkably
successful. In 1985, Peer Portner and his colleagues at Stanford reported the rst successful use of Baxter
Healthcare Corporation's Novacor LVAD, an implantable electromagnetic device, as a bridge to transplan-
tation.106 At the Texas Heart Institute, several successful trials of various LVAD's as bridges to transplant
followed. Included among these devices were several specialized pumps, geared at short and long-term uses
respectively.
Researchers attempting to rene LVAD systems as bridges to transplant faced serious scientic obstacles.
One of the most daunting challenges was designing a pump that didn't cause strokes within patients. The
strokes that were occurring resulted from problems that inhered within the placement of synthetic devices
inside the human body. As blood owed through LVAD's, white blood cells would detect even the tiniest
of imperfections or aws contained on the inside surfaces of the pumps.107 To combat the imperfections,
104Id.
105Id. p. 8
106Portner PM, Oyer PE, McGregor CGA, et. al. \First Human Use of An Electrically Powered Implantable Ventricular
Assist System", Artif Organs 1985;9:36.Abstract.
107see Transcript, supra note 19
22these cells would ll in the aws in order to generate an entirely smooth surface. As a result of this lling
in process, biological deposits would begin to form inside the pumps. The deposits weren't problems in and
of themselves; however, if these \emboli" somehow managed to break free from the surfaces of pumps into
the owing blood stream, they could eventually become lodged in small vessels within the brain, cutting o
perfusion and causing strokes within patients.
For years, scientists toiled away at rening the internal surfaces of their pumps. However, despite the
improvements generated by them, the materials produced still fell short of the standard of perfection required
by the human body. Essentially, white blood cells were equipped to identify even the most miniscule of aws,
and these aws were present despite the most strenuous eorts of researchers.
Frustration with the traditional approach of rening pump surfaces led to a sea change in terms of research
strategies. In the words of Dr. Mehmet Oz,
After years of trying to overpower Mother Nature, the tack was changed, and we said, `Let's allow
you to coat your blood cells over a very rough surface, a surface so rough that once your blood sticks
to it, it can't come o again.'108
Rather than undertaking the futile quest to develop a awless surface, researchers now focused their energies
on developing a strategically awed surface, one that would actually encourage the formation of biological
deposits, but at the same time prevent such deposits from ever breaking free into the blood stream and
causing strokes. The strategy proved to be an ingenious one. Soon, the Heartmate pump, the only completely
implantable device that actually employed the \rough surface" approach, began to dominate the market,
as its low stroke rate achieved signicant notoriety.109 Equipped with this revamped technology, hospitals
could now stabilize several patients for months or even years as they awaited the receipt of donor organs.
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23Another problem associated with LVAD technology was the extremely large size of the pumps. While large
patients could feasibly employ implantable, battery-powered pumps, the only available options for smaller
patients involved assist devices that remained outside their bodies. Since these patients needed to be attached
to large external consoles, they were forced to remain bedridden while they awaited transplant.110
The large sizes of LVAD systems were rooted in the assumption that the pumps needed to be \pulsatile",
namely, that they needed to \beat" in a way that mimicked the pumping action of the natural heart. Human
beings require a pulse in order to allow the natural heart to rest between beats, and absorb the energy that
the heart requires to pump blood.111 Recreating the pulse, while mechanically possible, greatly increased
the necessary size of pumps, due to the substantial power required by this process.
In attempting to develop smaller pumps that could better accommodate the needs of patients without large
body types, some scientists posited that while the natural heart needed time to rest between beats, a purely
mechanical device constructed of articial materials did not.112 One such scientist, Dr. Richard Wampler,
began to develop a non-pulsatile LVAD. Wampler was convinced that the body might not necessarily need
a pulse to function eectively. This belief in \continuous ow" pumps was rooted in his observations of how
blood actually functions within the human body. In his words,
It is true that if you go out into your arm, when you go to the doctor that you can feel your radial
artery and you'll feel a pulse, but when you go out on the capillary level, by that time, the pulsatility
is totally damped, so really at that level the ow is continuous ow going through these capillaries.113
Armed with this insight, Wampler and his team developed a tiny axial ow pump that could provide short-
term assistance to the heart. An axial ow pump functions by spinning an Archimedes screw; this screw
draws uid in at one end and sends it out the other.114 Through this pump, blood ows continuously without
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24a pulse. Wampler's device was tested on animals for about two years. Then, in 1988, surgeon O.H. \Bud"
Frazier implanted the device in a dying transplant patient.115 The results of this trial were remarkably
positive. The pump actually allowed the patient's weakened heart to rest long enough to recover. Most
importantly, this study showed that the nonpulsatile ow inherent within the device was well tolerated
by mammalian circulation.116 As Frazier notes, \That was a very dramatic thing because it showed us
that, number one, patients could live without a pulse."117 The optimism fostered by the initial trial of the
Hemopump was bolstered by the successes achieved by implants within several other patients after 1988.
Indeed, over 100 patients who could not utilize standard LVAD systems were saved by this technology.118
Frazier's experience with one young patient is particularly illustrative of the remarkable insights gained
through use of this device:
I had one little boy that lived for about three days without a pulse at all. He was very small, and
this small pump could take over his entire circulation. He woke up, he ate Popsicles and he did very
well until his heart had recovered enough to start beating.119
The Hemopump had eectively overcome the traditional presumption against the viability of nonpulsatile
LVAD's. Equipped with this new knowledge, researchers scrambled to create more rened instruments that
embodied Wampler's basic concepts. One remaining problem associated with the Hemopump was its lack of
power. Although the device could sustain a resting patient, it could only pump a small amount blood, far
from what was needed to provide a patient with longer-term support. Furthermore, Wampler's pump could
only be used temporarily, since it required a perpetual infusion of glucose to lubricate its moving parts.120
Scientists feared that increasing the power of the screw pump, given its stringent lubrication needs, meant
increasing the risk that blood owing through the pump would be damaged during the process.
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25In response, Robert Jarvik proposed that human blood itself could function as an eective lubricant for
the pumps.121 Jarvik's challenge prompted many researchers to explore the possibility of a self-lubricating,
continuous ow LVAD. Essentially,
the goal was to develop a permanent axial ow pump that was small enough to be implanted in the
chest, but powerful enough to push blood through the thousands of miles of vessels in the body.122
One of the researchers taking particular interest in this area was Dr. DeBakey. DeBakey had successfully
performed a heart transplant on NASA engineer David Saussier. Out of both gratitude and curiosity, Saussier
had become excited about the possible contributions that aerospace technology could make within the eld of
articial heart research.123 DeBakey, armed with Saussier's support, approached NASA about the possibility
of creating an implantable, permanent, axial ow pump for use in LVAD's.
NASA was an ideal source of research support in the area of axial ow pumps. Indeed, the pumps of the
space shuttle's main engines were themselves fueled by an axial ow motor system.124 NASA agreed to
collaborate with DeBakey in creating a permanent axial ow pump \at a fraction of the size of the current
pulsatile devices."125 Preliminary eorts produced a prototype device the size of a mere thumb.126 When
implanted inside the human body, it would create a powerful yet pulseless ow of blood. The device had
just one moving component, known as the impeller.127 The pump was powered through the use of magnets
that were implanted inside the impeller blades. Essentially, a coil would create a magnetic eld around the
impeller, and as the eld spun, it would drag the impeller with it. The use of magnetism to power the pump
was an ingenious approach. Indeed, the pump could be spun at about 10,000 rpm, \drawing the blood in,
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26propelling it out the back at about ve liters per minute."128
However, the high-speed magnet driven pumps were not without their own set of pitfalls. Adding magnets
into the equation necessarily aected the shape of the blades used to pump blood, and this created the risk
that blood would somehow be damaged as it owed through the pump. If such damage persisted, it would
render use of the powerful device untenable. In the words of scientist Bob Benkowski,
The best analogy I can think of is pumping blood is like pumping a whole bunch of water balloons
that are suspended in liquid. You're trying to pump these water balloons without having them
rupture.129
To combat the problem of damaged blood, NASA scientists turned to the eld of uid dynamics. Using
Cray super-computers, they electronically modeled the ow elds insides the pump's impeller.130 What
they discovered was that even the tiniest of changes in the pump's geometry, namely those approximating
10 or 20 thousandths of an inch in critical areas, would have a drastic eect on the overall viability of the
pump.131 Eectively, the changes would create localized areas of high and low pressure within the pump.132
The resultant blood damage would then reach levels that were clinically unacceptable.
After several rounds of trial and error, DeBakey and the NASA scientists were able to achieve their ultimate
goal, namely \designing magnetic blades which rotated so fast that blood cells weren't damaged at all."133
Bud Frazier describes the phenomenon in more accessible terms: \It's sort of like passing your nger through
a candle...if it goes fast enough, then you don't burn your nger."134
DeBakey's device is now a business venture known as the MicroMed DeBakey VAD.135 Silent, and weighing
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27less than 4 ounces, the device has undergone clinical trials in Europe since the late 1990's. Having received
IDE approval from FDA in the middle of 2000, DeBakey's team has been pursuing limited clinical trials at
Methodist Hospital in Houston. Indeed, in January of this year, the FDA granted approval to expand this
feasibility study to three sites and twenty patients.136 Early results from both the European and Ameri-
can trials are promising, and DeBakey remains optimistic that his pump will one day achieve widespread
acceptance within the health care system.
While DeBakey continued to perfect his miniaturized LVAD pump, Jarvik, working independently with a
team in Manhattan, was hard at work developing his own axial ow pump. Appropriately named the Jarvik
2000, this pump is so small that it can actually be placed inside the human heart.137 In fact, the pump is
designed to be implanted inside the tip of the left ventricle.138 Blood from the heart ows directly into the
device, where it is pumped out to the various organs and tissues of the body. When it returns to the heart
upon regeneration, the process essentially repeats itself. The only tube connected to the Jarvik 2000 is the
outow pump that exits the heart. Thus, by eliminating the inow tube, Jarvik eectively removed a location
where blood clots are likely to form.139 Furthermore, unlike many pumps which require the conventional
\opening of the chest" in order to achieve eective implantation, the Jarvik-2000 requires a less invasive
incision on the left side of the chest.140 Due to its relative ease of implantation, patients utilizing the device
face shorter stints on heart-lung machines. Thus, their required periods of recovery post-transplant are also
reduced.
136see \Press Releases", at http://www.micromedtech.com/micromednews.htm (April 4, 2001)
137see Transcript, supra note 19
138Id.
139Id.
140\First Jarvik 2000 Clinical Trials Participant Receives New Heart" (July 20, 2000), at
http://www.texasheartinstitute.org/j2000700.html (April 8, 2001)
28Jarvik's team spent almost a decade rening his axial ow pump. In its nal form, the device was the size of
a \C" battery, and capable of pumping blood throughout the body at the rate of six liters per minute, near
the top end of the range that characterizes the natural human heart.141 The pump itself is non-pulsatile,
although the natural heart continues to beat and thus provides a pulse.142
Early in the year 2000, Jarvik received FDA approval of an IDE to begin testing the Jarvik 2000 pump as a
bridge to transplant at the Texas Heart Institute.143 Then, on April 10, 2000, the device was implanted in a
human being for the rst time. The patient, Lois Spiller, was a 52 year old woman suering from a form of
cardiomyopathy that had led to an enlarged heart. Prior to receiving the pump, Spiller was bedridden and
experiencing severe chest pain. Her experience using the Jarvik-2000 proved remarkably successful. Spiller
survived on the pump for 79 days as she awaited the receipt of a donor heart. On June 28, 2000 the donor
heart arrived, and was implanted within her by Frazier at St Luke's Hospital in Houston.144 In Frazier's eyes,
the series of procedures went exactly as planned. He asserted, \The heart-assist device performed extremely
well and enabled [Spiller] to build up her strength before undergoing her transplant."145 As of this paper's
writing, Spiller's donor heart is performing well, and her condition continues to improve.
Three additional patients have received Jarvik 2000 transplants since Spiller's successful experiment, and
although a couple of them continue to await the receipt of donor hearts, the assist device is performing quite
well within them. In fact, in November of 2000, the FDA granted permission to Jarvik's team to extend the
clinical trial of the device by ve additional patients.146 Although much remains to be seen with regard to
the device's long-term outcomes, its short-term success within clinical trials bodes well for the eld of heart
assist technology. Jarvik views his informal competition with DeBakey in the development of tiny LVAD's as
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29healthy for the eld of medicine. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the fact that what really matters is success
at the end stage of the game. In his words, \If you compare it to a prize ght, who throws the punch rst
is not so important as who's there at the end and who throws the punch last."147
As LVAD technology has continued to improve over the past decade, doctors have begun to reconsider the
goals that underlie these devices. As previously noted, LVAD's were originally geared towards patients that
were recovering from heart surgery. As time passed, researchers became optimistic about the possibility of
utilizing LVAD's as bridges to transplant for patients awaiting donor organs. However, a large percentage
of patients awaiting donor organs were required to wait substantial periods of time between receipt of their
LVAD's and actual organ transplantation. This externally imposed waiting period allowed physicians to
observe, through electronic imaging, the short-term eects of LVAD use on the natural hearts of patients. In
some cases, what they found astonished them. One such case involved Norbert Hilbert, a German patient
suering from a viral infection in his heart.148 In September of 1994, Hilbert was rushed to the Berlin Heart
Institute as his condition began to worsen. X-rays showed that Hilbert's heart was extremely enlarged.
Berlin doctors implanted an LVAD device inside Hilbert, and he began the interminable wait for a donor
organ. Nine months later, doctors noticed something out of the ordinary on Hilbert's X-rays: his heart
had shrunk back, and was now nearly its normal size. This shrinkage was attributable to the important
supplementary function performed by Hilbert's LVAD device. In the words of Dr. Stephen Westaby,
What happens when you put an LVAD into the left ventricle is that there is no longer pressure
within that heart chamber, and completely rests the left ventricle. And what chronic rest does is
allow the very much enlarged heart cells to go back to normal size. If you intervene early enough,
you'll get that heart failure process to reverse.149
Rather than continuing the wait for a donor organ, Hilbert's doctors allowed his heart to complete its process
of recovery, and then removed the LVAD device for good. Years later, Hilbert's heart was functioning as
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30well as ever.
Hilbert's case is illustrative of the monumental contemporary conception known as \bridge to recovery."150
Essentially, certain patients whose hearts are severely damaged, but not irreparably so, are provided nite
support from cardiac-assist devices. Once the process of rest and recovery has completed its course, the
devices are removed, and patients utilize their natural hearts for the remainder of their lives. The \bridge
to recovery" approach was borne of the time limitations inherent within the use of LVAD devices as bridges
to transplantation. In heart disease patients utilizing the latter approach, doctors were able to compare
myocardial tissue samples at the time of maximal heart failure, namely that of LVAD implantation, with
samples taken from the heart at the time of transplantation, after the heart had received prolonged cardiac
rest by virtue of the assist device.151 These comparisons revealed that for some patients, improvements
generated by use of LVAD's rendered heart transplantation at the second stage unnecessary.
Although patients like Norbert Hilbert have demonstrated the feasibility of a bridge to recovery approach,
doctors continue to struggle when it comes to identifying those patients for whom such an approach is
practical. It remains the case that some patients have natural hearts that are too damaged to employ
an LVAD-only approach. Nevertheless, as researchers become more adept at singling out patients in the
bridge to recovery category, the overall demand for heart transplants may be reduced, which represents good
news for patients on waiting lists, for whom allotransplantion remains the only hope. Recent developments
indicate, however, that patients in this latter category may soon be granted access to a holy grail of their
own.
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31AbioCor Total Articial Heart
Although the 1982 Barney Clark research episode was extremely informative in many regards, the experience
in several ways served to chill eorts at developing total articial heart technology. This chilling eect
stemmed in large part from the negative public perceptions that accompanied Clark's pioneering experiment.
When Clark was interviewed three months following his transplant, several disturbing facts came to the fore.
Although Clark was in fact cognizant, the life-sustaining machine to which he was connected was both bulky
and noisy, and Clark appeared to be visibly shaken by its life altering ancillary eects.152 Indeed, Thomas
Preston asserts that after the operation, Clark's reliance on the cumbersome Jarvik-7 apparatus aorded
what amounted to a \negative quality of life."153 The extremely large amount of media coverage provided
to the Clark operation proved to be a double-edged sword for researchers in this area. While the press' love
aair with Clark's story initially focused public attention on the amazing potential benets of heart research,
the vivid and disturbing images of Clark's suering after his operation shifted public opinion squarely in the
opposite direction. Commentators who had once championed the eorts of ambitious heart surgeons now
openly questioned whether it was appropriate for human physicians to be \playing God" in this area. Even
those who chose not to oppose the technology on abstract moral grounds questioned whether the technology
could ever be rened to a point where its health benets would outweigh its value as a mere scientic or
theoretical curiosity. Although the notion of a man eternally strapped to a noisy device the size of a laundry
machine might be tolerable for forward looking physicians and researchers, the public at large viewed the
concept as utterly inhumane and entirely unacceptable. As noted earlier in this paper, the changing tides of
public perception led to signicant changes in the priorities of researchers. Rather than continuing to toil
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32away in a eld that now bore the label \The Dracula of Medical Technology"154, most scientists shifted their
focus toward partial and temporary devices that could aid in the recovery process of damaged hearts, and
provide short run support for those patients likely to receive donor organs.
Despite popular perceptions, however, the Jarvik-7 device utilized in the Clark case was far from a categorical
failure. After a brief hiatus following its failed use as a destination therapy, the Jarvik-7 was successfully
utilized a number of times as a bridge to transplant for patients awaiting donor organs.155 As doctors became
more adept at using anticoagulant drugs to reduce the risk of stroke associated with these transplants, the
success rate of the device continued to improve.156 Indeed, since 1993, 147 patients have been supported
by Jarvik's original articial heart, and 88 of these patients ultimately survived till their scheduled organ
transplants.157
Dr. David Lederman, unlike most of his peers and perhaps the rest of society, viewed the 1982 Clark
experiment as a marked success. Rather than shifting gears squarely toward partial devices, Lederman
maintained eorts at perfecting total articial heart technology at his rm, Abiomed Inc, while attempting
to remedy several of the obstacles that had been discovered during the Clark case. Based in Danvers,
MA, Abiomed has focused its energies over the past decade on developing, manufacturing, and marketing
products designed to assist or replace the failing heart.158 Abiomed has attempted to inltrate all areas of
the \heart failure" market by providing a range of products designed to assist persons with varying degrees
of life threatening or life impairing heart failure.159 In doing so, it has established itself as a pioneer in
the area of mechanical cardiac intervention, a eld geared at improving and extending the lives of patients
\whose needs have exceeded the limits of pharmaceutical therapies, cardiological intervention, and surgical
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33correction."160 Although the company maintains signicant involvement in all areas of the heart failure
market, its attention is currently focused on the AbioCor Implantable Replacement Heart. This device is a
fully implantable prosthetic system, intended as a destination therapy for patients whose natural hearts are
severely damaged due to conditions involving coronary heart disease or some form of congestive end-stage
heart failure.161 The AbioCor is premised on the notion that some patients have hearts that have suered
irreparable harm. For such patients, death is imminent unless a replacement can be found in short time. Due
to the inherent shortage of human donor organs, however, many of these patients die before organs become
available. The AbioCor is society's most promising current attempt at saving patients in this category.
The device itself is a technological and engineering marvel. Weighing a mere two pounds, AbioCor is a
hybrid instrument composed of both titanium and plastic.162 The small size and light weight of AbioCor
represent signicant advances over prior attempts at creating total articial hearts, as illustrated by the
suering of patients like Haskell Karp and Barney Clark. Unlike many of its various predecessors, AbioCor
doesn't necessarily require that patients utilizing the device have large physical builds or body types capable
of handling the implantation of bulky instruments inside the abdomen. In fact, the AbioCor is approximately
size of a grapefruit163, a welcome fact for the women, children and smaller men that were eectively excluded
by the constraints of prior technology.
AbioCor embodies several other improvements over prior eorts at creating total articial hearts. After
implantation, the device does not need to be tethered to external power sources by tubes or wires passing
through the skin. Rather, AbioCor receives its much-needed power through \transcutaneous" transmission,
a process that takes place across intact skin.164 The fact that the device can function independent of wiring
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34and tubing that cuts through the skin provides a signicant reduction in the risk of infection relative to that
faced by patients utilizing older technologies. This risk was so serious that Dr. Mehmet Oz, one of the most
highly respected contemporary cardiac surgeons, once labeled the percutaneous line the \Achilles heal" of
articial heart technology.165
The AbioCor's functional process is modeled after the process utilized by the natural human heart. In fact,
AbioCor, like the human heart, actually consists of two blood pumping chambers. The \right" pump is
charged with supplying blood to the patient's lungs, while the \left" pump provides blood to other vital
organs and to the rest of the body.166 Each of the AbioCor's pumps is capable of delivering more than
two gallons of blood, or approximately eight liters, during every minute of its operation.167 Despite this
staggering physical capability, the device actually operates in relatively quiet fashion. Indeed, a stethoscope
is required to listen to the \heart sounds" produced by the machine.168
The process through which power is supplied to the AbioCor device is itself rather ingenious. AbioCor
contains an internal controller that is embodied within the prosthetic implant.169 This controller regulates
the level of power that is supplied to the device based on its needs at any given moment in time. The device's
needs, in turn, are determined by the needs of the patient's body. Indeed, the AbioCor system is designed
to increase or decrease its pump rate in response to the body's demands. These demands can shift during
situations involving physical exertion and the like.
Without actually piercing the patient's intact skin, an external controller transmits power to the AbioCor's
internal controller, in eect \recharging" it as its power supply begins to diminish with use. The internal
controller is supplemented by another, smaller internal battery which is rechargeable as well. This supple-
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35mentary battery allows the patient to be entirely free of the external power transmission unit for a certain
period of time, while continuing to be monitored by AbioCor's internal system. The virtue of this back-up
battery system is that it allows patients to perform certain daily tasks that would otherwise not be possible,
such as taking showers and going for short swims.170
Finally, the AbioCor contains a relatively sophisticated active monitoring system that is charged with provid-
ing detailed performance feedback. The system contains alarms that are triggered when patients experience
forms of health irregularities that are tied to the device.171
Over the past several years, Abiomed engineers and physicians have been working diligently on rening the
AbioCor in order to obtain approval by the relevant regulatory agencies. Due to the signicant risks posed
by use of the device, the process of renement has proven particularly painstaking. Essentially, Abiomed has
been attempting to demonstrate the mechanical prociency of the machine, while at the same time highlight-
ing the device's ability to withstand the rigorous conditions created within human biological settings. In the
process, the rm has formulated several tests and standards with regard to each of these areas. Due to the
extreme physical demands placed on the AbioCor device, Abiomed scientists were forced to utilize a material
capable of bending forty million times a year for twenty years without breaking.172 Commercially available
plastic would surely crack under such stress. This fact led to the development of Angioex, a proprietary
Abiomed material used in the construction of the AbioCor. One test of this material's eectiveness requires
the device to pump two hundred million times in a row without failing, namely, enough to sustain human
life for ve years.173 Another particularly interesting test involved placing AbioCor in a bath of salty water
for a sustained period time. This test attempted to demonstrate the capacity of the machine's titanium
and plastic components for surviving the corrosive eects of blood inside the body.174 Finally, to gauge the
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36functionality of the AbioCor heart, scientists implanted the device within calves at the Texas Heart Institute.
The results of these implants were quite successful, although researchers were somewhat constrained by the
fact that the young calves tested quickly outgrew the devices as they began to age.
One climax of Abiomed's rigorous research eorts in the area of total articial heart technology occurred
on December 22, 2000. On that day, Abiomed completed its IDE submission to FDA, requesting regula-
tory approval to commence initial human trials of the AbioCor Implantable Replacement Heart.175 The
submission of AbioCor's IDE application to FDA represented a signicant accomplishment for all parties
involved in the product's development, as it was the culmination of countless hours of eort spanning several
years.176 However, this event held special importance for Dr. Lederman in particular. He had, after all,
been one of the few persons on the fringe of the research eld who had steadfastly weathered the storm of
public sentiment following the Barney Clark episode. Lederman noted that \The completion of the AbioCor
IDE submission is a major milestone on the path to bringing heart replacement technology to the tens of
thousands of people in heart failure who have little hope of receiving a human heart transplant."177
In an attempt at quickly disseminating knowledge of its research progress in this area, Abiomed chose clinical
centers for its prospective trials that spanned the entire United States. These centers included the Brigham
and Women's Hospital teamed with Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, the Texas Heart Institute in
Houston, and UCLA Medical Center in Los Angeles.178 Abiomed further noted that it planned to commence
international trials of the AbioCor in various medical centers shortly after clinical trials began in the United
States.
Dr Robert T.V. Kung, Abiomed's Chief Scientic Ocer, was optimistic about the device's chances at
receiving FDA approval for clinical testing. He stated,
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37Our testing of the AbioCor in preparation for initial human trials has been extensive and the results
of this testing have been very encouraging...Subject to regulatory approval, we hope for the rst
human transplant of the AbioCor to occur in the U.S. during the rst half of 2001.179
Dr Kung noted that prior to receiving FDA approval of the IDE, Abiomed would continue its eorts at
producing sucient quantities of the AbioCor device, while clearing lines of communication with its associates
at various clinical centers to ensure that trials would begin quickly and smoothly upon receipt of regulatory
approval.
Abiomed was quite candid about the ambitious goals tied to its projected clinical trials. Dr Kung asserted
that the trials would attempt to demonstrate that, for certain patients who were experiencing end-stage
heart failure and who were not viable candidates for human heart transplantation or other forms of available
therapy, use of the AbioCor would provide improved levels of life expectancy along with an acceptable quality
of life.180 At the end of the day, Dr. Kung predicted that \successful completion of clinical trials should
generate the clinical data necessary to submit to the corresponding Regulatory Authorities for approval to
market the AbioCor in the U.S. and internationally."181
The optimism exhibited by Lederman and Kung in late December proved to be extremely well founded.
On January 31, 2001, a mere month after Abiomed's submission of its IDE application for AbioCor, the
rm announced that it had received permission from the FDA to commence its initial clinical trials.182 The
FDA letter received by Abiomed authorized the rm to undertake implantation of the AbioCor in the rst
ve patients of the slated clinical trial. Authority to implant the device in further patients was reserved
by the FDA, which noted that grants of such authority would be predicated on the \success" experienced
by the rst ve transplant patients. Success, according to the FDA, would be based upon periodic review
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38of the patients and the progression of their health conditions. A further factor impacting success would be
the patients' quality of life \as measured by a variety of assessment instruments previously validated for
end-stage heart failure patients."183 The FDA letter of authorization required Abiomed to respond to a
number of questions left unresolved in its IDE application, but assured the rm that initiation of clinical
trials would not be left contingent upon any responses received by FDA.
The FDA's overall response clearly provided validation for Abiomed and its leaders on a number of levels.
Furthermore, the staggeringly quick turnaround time between the AbioCor's application and receipt of IDE
approval indicated the intense rigor with which Abiomed's engineers and physicians had approached the
process of testing in the pre-clinical stages. Dr Lederman asserted that the IDE application had in fact been
\extraordinarily comprehensive, totaling thousands of pages of highly technical material in eighteen vol-
umes."184 Lederman further noted that one plausible reason for the AbioCor's extremely short turnaround
time for approval was rooted within Abiomed's solid relationship and frequent interactions with the FDA's
Oce of Device Evaluation over the AbioCor's development period.185 This relationship and familiarity
provided the rm with important direction related to the improvement of testing protocols. These improve-
ments, in turn, impressed the FDA and provided it with a degree of condence when the time came to
sanction initial trials in human beings.
Abiomed is currently in the process of making nal preparations for the commencement of human trials
at its various clinical centers. At the moment, it appears that Dr. Lederman's stated goal of commencing
trials during the rst half of the current year is close to becoming reality. However, the experiences of prior
pioneers in this eld of research indicate that Lederman's most important and trying test lies just around the
corner. The rst patients to receive AbioCor hearts will surely become media darlings, just as Haskell Karp
and Barney Clark did decades ago. The success or failure of these patients' implants will surely inuence
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39the direction and funding of articial heart research well into the 21st century.
Concluding Remarks
Many important lessons can be gleaned from the experiences of heart surgeons and researchers over the past
several decades. One such lesson involves the love-hate relationship between leaders in the eld, and members
of the media charged with covering high prole experiments. In one sense, pioneers like DeBakey, Jarvik, and
Lederman are heavily reliant on the media to promote their path breaking quests to outwit Mother Nature.
After all, the public's consciousness regarding the potential contributions that science can make to humanity
is heavily inuenced by the portrayals that cutting edge technologies receive within the press. Furthermore,
public sentiment is one of the most important factors inuencing lawmakers charged with the allocation of
scarce resources to a seemingly innite number of worthy research endeavors. The virtue of media coverage
is thus twofold: it has the capacity to inform the public about the latest developments within a particular
eld, and to excite society about the potential future benets aorded by certain technologies.
However, as the various research episodes chronicled within this paper illustrate, heightened press coverage
of particularly notorious experiments has a double-edged quality. If a trial achieves successful results dur-
ing its fteen minutes within the spotlight, then the researchers leading it are celebrated within the press,
and will likely be rewarded with increased leverage with regard to future funding. On the other hand, if
a trial achieves less than spectacular results, its consequences lie in the opposite direction, and are in fact
compounded to an exponential degree. Essentially, failed trials lead persons to question not only the merits
of particular experiments, but rather the entire eld of research underlying them. Further complicating
40matters is the fact that heart researchers are held to the most exacting of standards. Although a device
may for the most part function eectively, if it doesn't deliver exactly what its proponents promised, then
it is considered a complete failure. Thus, results that forward looking physicians and researchers regard as
optimistic may be deemed disastrous by lay persons. The uncompromising social standards applied to initial
device trials are problematic when one considers the fact that the patients most likely to receive previously
untested articial heart devices are those whose conditions have to deteriorated to the point where they
are no longer eligible to receive traditional forms of therapy such as allotransplantation. Thus, the deck is
eectively stacked against researchers performing these initial trials, in the sense that the slated recipients
of experimental devices are patients with high rates of comorbidity, persons likely to succumb to a host of
conditions due to the stressful circumstances inherent within heart surgery. Taken together, these factors
provide insight into why high prole trials such as those involving Karp and Clark served to chill entire
research elds for nearly a decade, despite the important lessons they provided.
The above observations reect a fundamental tension underlying the eld of articial heart research. Al-
though most members of society are somewhat intrigued by the ability of gifted heart surgeons to sometimes
outmaneuver the natural process of dying, most also feel an inherent sense of discomfort when confronted
by an approach that so clearly juxtaposes the God-given with the man-made. If a particular trial runs
smoothly, then many are likely to overlook the visual spectacle that is necessarily created when articial
devices are merged with the human body. However, if the trial fails, the same group is likely to revert to its
intrinsic sense of skepticism toward the eld. Scientists once deemed to be pathbreakers are now vilied as
out of control renegades. Physicians once regarded as humanitarian healers are now characterized as egotists
whose God complexes lead them to compromise the lives of their fellow men and women, all in the name of
progress. This duality is clearly encapsulated within a recent piece by Michael Lemonick.186 Reecting on
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41the amazing potential of devices such as the Jarvik-2000 and the AbioCor, Lemonick nonetheless observes,
Impressive as all of this sounds, nobody is sure what it will be like to live with any of these machines
long-term. Maybe technology has merely found a more ecient way to torture heart patients.187
Despite the signicant notoriety that accompanies success in the eld of articial heart technology, the list
of those heart pioneers held in high historical esteem remains relatively short. Indeed, some members of
this elite group, like DeBakey and Jarvik, are \repeat players" in the sense that their accomplishments span
multiple decades and diering technologies. The exclusivity of this club appears to be a function both of the
inherent complexity that characterizes articial heart technology, as well as the unwillingness of otherwise
qualied researchers and scientists to enter a eld in which they will perpetually be required to walk on
eggshells, in the way that heart researchers must. After all, while a failed software program or even an
imperfect pharmaceutical product may earn a scientist a certain degree of disrepute, it is unlikely that he or
she will ever be accused of playing God.
Researchers who do work up the courage to enter this eld must balance the threat of highly visible \failure"
against the less visible, yet equally destructive threat of standing still. This observation holds special
importance at a time when heart disease continues to ex its powerful might within society, as evidenced
by the staggering increase in death rates from cardiac arrest over the course of the 1990's.188 Interestingly,
history has illustrated that even among the relatively few members of this eld, disparate risk proles abound.
For example, in Cooley's mind, implantation of the Liotta Heart in Haskell Karp represented a reasoned,
calculated gamble. To DeBakey, such an experiment was far ahead of its time. In one sense, the case's
ultimate outcome seemed to vindicate DeBakey's position. Despite the clarity of hindsight, however, Cooley's
central belief in the importance of keeping articial heart research at the fore of the public consciousness
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42remains a valid one. If society were to somehow lose interest in the potential benets of MCSS technology,
then researchers in this area would lose access to the public and private funding that they desperately need
in order to ensure continued advancement.
Although the most noteworthy points on the timeline of articial heart technology are experiments that
were initially considered failures to at least some extent, much progress has in fact been made over the past
half century. Assuming arguendo that cutting edge devices like the AbioCor will generate benets analogous
to those of their predecessors, however, several important policy issues remain to be dealt with. The rst
of these relates to the extremely large cost that is currently associated with articial heart devices. As
these miracles of science continue to proliferate, it is a near certainty that equity issues will begin to assume
increasing importance. As the Institute of Medicine (IOM) reported in 1991,
Because of the high cost of MCSSs both individually and in the aggregate...private third-party
payers, Medicare, and state Medicaid programs are likely to resist approving coverage for MCSS
implantations. The time is ripe for the United States to make clear decisions about access to health
care, including costly new technologies.189
For a variety of reasons, the U.S. has made minimal progress in the area of health care reform over the past
decade. Thus, the issues highlighted by the IOM in 1991 remain ripe for resolution.
In addition to the monetary costs associated with the implantation of articial hearts, society will be forced
to shoulder signicant additional costs in the form of human capital. As the above procedures become
more widely accepted, it is paramount that the available supply of adequately trained personnel, including
surgeons, nurses and the like, increase accordingly.
The eld of articial heart technology is unique, in the sense that a great social need for advancement has been
met by levels of private sector funding that are inadequate at best.190 As previously noted, this inadequacy
can be explained by the innumerable forms of scientic, economic, and social uncertainty that characterize
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43the development of such devices. Despite these constraints, society has managed to make meaningful progress
in this area over the past several decades. In order to ensure that this trend continues, it is paramount that
government agencies remain involved in this arena, through formal funding or cost sharing arrangements
with parties in the private sector. Furthermore, eorts must be undertaken to ensure that the channels
of communication remain open between researchers operating on the cutting edge. Although competition
is surely healthy for the industry in some senses, certain forms of collaboration can ensure that wasteful
duplication of eorts is kept to a minimum.
The scientic import of the heart, combined with its cultural signicance, renders heart research a particularly
sensitive area in which to pursue the betterment of society. Nevertheless, pioneers with the courage to plow
forward in this eld over the last half century have saved countless lives as a result of their unwavering eorts.
One thing, however, remains clear. If society is ever to reap the full rewards oered by MCSS technology,
it will have to recalibrate its attitudes regarding the eld in a more open-minded direction, one that hinges
less on short term success, and more on long-term progress. Heroic patients like Barney Clark have accepted
this challenge. Time will tell if society at large is capable of doing the same.
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